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Drawing from the personal tape recordings made during the presidency of 
Richard Nixon, we uncover and report in this paper new evidence that Nixon manipulated 
Arthur Burns and the Federal Reserve Bank into creating a political business cycle that 
helped secure Nixon’s reelection victory in 1972.   Nixon understood the risks that his 
desired monetary policy imposed, but chose to trade longer-term economic costs to the 
economy for his own short-term political benefit. 
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   3 
Introduction. 
Over thirty-years ago, William Nordhaus (1975) initiated the literature on the 
opportunistic political business cycle, the idea that politicians regardless of their party 
affiliation try to maximize their chances for reelection by creating favorable economic 
environments in the run-up to elections.  If operative, the opportunistic political business 
cycle should yield economic fluctuations that follow the election cycle.  Nordhaus’ work 
has spawned hundreds of papers, but support for his hypothesis has been far from 
unanimous (see, e.g., Alesina, et al., 1997).   
Richard Nixon knew well the importance of economic conditions, especially 
unemployment, in affecting presidential election outcomes and blamed his narrow defeat 
in the 1960 presidential election on a weak economy.  After winning the presidency in 
1968, he became dissatisfied with secretarial minute-taking and secretly substituted tape 
recording devices in the White House.   The tapes provide witness to the views and 
opinions of decision-makers that often conflicted with their public statements.  The tapes 
reveal that Nixon, more than being a “Keynesian,” as he once described himself, was a 
“Monetarist.”  He was well versed in the then-current monetary policy theory 
championed by Milton Friedman.  He knew monetary policy’s short-run effect on interest 
rates, its impact lag, and its longer-run effect on inflation.  He believed firmly that 
monetary growth rates were crucial for changing aggregate demand and the 
unemployment rate in the short run.    On the other hand, he and his close advisors 
showed little or no understanding of the effects of inflationary expectations on nominal 
interest rates and the distinction between real and nominal interest rates.  Regardless, 
over the next several years, he obsessed about money supply growth rates and fought to   4 
get monetary policy sufficiently expansionary and nominal interest rates lower in a timely 
fashion to reduce unemployment prior to the 1972 election.   
Since individuals visiting Nixon were unaware that they were being recorded, 
their views captured by the Nixon tapes are more likely to represent their true positions 
than their positions exposited in public forums.  In this paper, we draw extensively from 
the Nixon tapes to reveal new evidence of successful presidential interference in 
monetary policy that produced an opportunistic political business cycle.   The tapes 
reveal new details on how the Fed’s independence was threatened and compromised to 
achieve Nixon’s desired monetary policy for short-run political gain. 
Monetary Policy 1969-1970. 
  In presidential-election year 1968, the unemployment rate finished low, but 
inflation was heating up (see Figure 1).  With the election over and a Republican 
president in office, William McChesney Martin, Jr., chair of the Fed, tightened monetary 
policy by slashing money growth rates by approximately 80 percent (Figure 2) , but the 
inflation rate rose to over  6 percent. With tighter monetary policy in place, the economy 
entered recession in December of 1969.  Martin’s term with the Fed expired at the end of 
January, 1970 and President Richard Nixon appointed an old friend and party loyalist, 
Arthur Burns, to chair the Fed.  Burns inherited an economy in the midst of an 
inflationary recession.   
Burns’ chairmanship, February, 1970-November, 1971.  
  In February, 1970, Burns took over the chairmanship of the Fed and monetary 
policy decidedly became more expansionary (Figure 2).   Money growth rates for M1 and 
M2 in 1969, the last year of Martin’s chairmanship, were 3.2 percent and 2.3 percent.  In   5 
1970, Burns’ first year as chair, money growth rates for M1 and M2 accelerated to 5.5 
percent and 8.1 percent.
1
February 19, 1971.  
  By February, 1971, Burns had overseen a full year of monetary 
ease but Nixon pushed for still greater monetary expansion.  Burns resisted. 
Burns: “In my view the monetary authority… has laid the foundation for recovery. … 
What is holding back the economy now is not any shortage of money but a certain 
shortage of confidence.  If we flooded the banks even more than we have I think you 
could have awful problems in 1972 and beyond.”
2
  Burns is clearly acknowledging his view that further increasing the growth rates 
for the monetary aggregates in 1971 would worsen inflationary pressures in 1972 and 
beyond.   
 
March 5, 1971. 
  Treasury Secretary John Connally joins Nixon in exhorting Burns to take a more 
expansionary stance, but again Burns resists.     
Connally: “We need to drive this interest rate down.” 
Burns: “…..We could make matters worse by making money easier…..If anybody gets 
the notion, you see, that we are easing monetary policy further, that will intensify these 
fears of a rise in interest rates later on.”
3
  Burns clearly indicates once again that he had, in his view, eased monetary policy 
sufficiently (despite the already inflationary environment) and acknowledges that 
 
                                                 
1 These growth rates are computed using money stock measures reported in the March 1972 Federal 
Reserve Bulletin. 
2 Conversation 454-4, February 19, 1971. Nixon, Treasury Secretary John Connally, Burns, Shultz and 
Council of Economic Advisors Chairman Paul McCracken. 
3  Conversation 462-13, March 5, 1971. Quadriad meeting with Nixon, Burns, Shultz, Connally and 
McCracken.  (The Quadriad comprised Nixon’s four chief economic advisors.)   6 
expansionary monetary policy would likely raise inflationary expectations and interest 
rates.  At the end of the meeting, the others leave and Connally stays to talk with Nixon.  
Nixon praises Connally for stressing the need to lower interest rates.  Data reveal that 
rates had already fallen dramatically under Burns’ chairmanship.  The federal funds rate, 
for example, had fallen from over nine percent to under four percent (Figure 2). 
   Neither Connally nor Nixon is an economist, but they know the monetary policy 
appropriate for their political objective and that they want Burns to cooperate. 
Nixon:   “He’s [Burns is] ruthless.  He plays all the bureaucracy.  He plays all the press.  
He does the leaks.  He does everything else, John.” 
Connally:   “He plays that Hill … in a big way.  Both sides.” 
Nixon:   “I’d be delighted to be the first President in 25 years to take the Fed on if it 
becomes necessary.” 
Connally:   “He can force these interest rates down and that ought to be done.”
4
  Nixon is clearly frustrated by Burns’ independence and indicates he is prepared to 
“take on” the Fed to get his desired monetary policy.  This is the first mention in the 
Nixon tapes concerning an explicit threat to the independence of the Fed.  There will be 
more.   
 
March 16, 1971. 
  Nixon and Connally discuss Burns.  They discuss the need to rein in Burns and 
who should do it.  Connally says he will talk to Burns and tell him to stay out of 
Connally’s territory.  He’ll tell Burns, “If you want to maintain the independence of this 
Federal Reserve System, you oughtn’t to be talking about wage and price policies and 
                                                 
4 Conversation 462 – 15, March 5, 1971. Nixon, Chief of Staff H. R. (Bob) Haldeman and Connally.     7 
fiscal affairs…it’s not your business…sure you’re knowledgeable about it, but what the 
hell, you’re running the Federal Reserve now.”     
     Also in this conversation,   
Nixon: “…he is also wrong in terms of monetary supply, damn it!  Everybody except 
Arthur thinks it [the money supply] ought to be higher and let’s just keep hitting him on 
that…..He [Burns] must not do things that are going to embarrass the Administration.”
5
  Contrary to Nixon’s claim that “everybody” thinks the money supply should be 
higher, Nixon will hear (reported below) from Milton Friedman that monetary policy is 
already too expansionary.  The embarrassment that Burns might inflict on the 
Administration is apparently to allow the unemployment rate to remain too high.    
 
March 18, 1971 
Connally reports to the President about his meeting with Burns.  Connally’s 
message to Burns was that Burns is losing his influence in the Administration.  Connally 
told Burns, “If I read the tea leaves right, that isn’t the way things are going.  They’re 
going the other way.’  I said, ‘you’re isolating yourself more and more.  …  Normally the 
Treasury and Federal Reserve will be right together and that’s the way I want it, but if 
you’re going to isolate yourself, I can’t go with you.”
6
   Connally and Nixon are letting Burns know that he is rapidly becoming the odd-
man out due to his opposition to increasing the growth rate of the money supply to 
stimulate the economy.  Burns, by being too independent, is told he is isolating himself. 
Burns needs to get onboard with the Treasury (i.e., Connally) or face the consequences.  
One of the consequences, never explicitly mentioned, is that Burns’ reappointment as Fed 
  
                                                 
5 Conversation 468 – 15, March 16, 1971.  Nixon and Connally.   
6 Conversation 469 – 9, March 18, 1971.  Nixon and Connally.   8 
chair could be in danger.  The position as chair is only for four years and Burns’ term as 
chair would be up in February, 1974.   Another consequence, one likely to have been of 
more importance to Burns, is a challenge to the Fed’s independence. 
  Later that day, Nixon meets with Haldeman and Ehrlichman and praises 
Connally: “That’s the only man that can stand up to Arthur [Burns]. …  You tell him 
what you want, he does it.”  Nixon’s admiration for Connally and disdain for Burns are 
both increasing.
7
March 19, 1971. 
 
Nixon stresses to Burns that monetary policy should be geared towards reducing 
unemployment in 1972 and that he is well aware of monetary policy’s impact lag on 
economic growth and employment. 
Nixon (to Burns):  “We’ve really got to think of goosing it … late summer and fall of this 
year [1971] and next year [1972].  As you know there’s a hell of a lag.”
8
March 19, 1971 
   
  Nixon and Burns meet.  Burns is upset about criticism through press leaks.  He 
emphasizes his loyalty to the President. 
Burns:  “I’m doing my basic job at the Fed [tape skips] I’m a dedicated man, to serve the 
health and strength of our national economy, and I’ve done everything in my power, as I 
see it to help keep pressing your reputation, your standing in American life and in history.  
I’ve never seen a conflict between the two.  But I want you to know this, if a conflict did 
arise, the moment a conflict arises, I’m going to be right here [Burns bangs the table for 
                                                 
7 Conversation 469 – 13, March 18, 1971.  Nixon and Counsel and  Assistant to the President for Domestic 
Affairs John Ehrlichman. 
8 Conversation 470 – 18, March 19, 1971.  Nixon and Burns.   9 
emphasis].  And I’ll tell you about it and we’ll talk it out, and try to decide together 
where to go next.”
9
Burns is restating his loyalty to Nixon while acknowledging that policy 
differences exist between them.  His tone suggests he might be amenable to compromise 
on his monetary policy stance.  But for now, before “talking it out,” he makes another 
pitch for rejecting a more expansionary monetary policy by introducing a new 
consideration.  
 
Burns:  “To drive interest rates lower would run the risk of accelerating an international 
monetary crisis.”   
This conversation is the first mention by Burns linking expansionary monetary 
policy to the developing international monetary crisis.  In terms of the Mundell-Fleming 
model, a country on a fixed-exchange-rate regime that engages in a relatively 
expansionary monetary policy would experience a balance of payments deficit and loss of 
international reserves.  To correct the balance of payments deficit, the deficit country 
could purse a tighter monetary policy or persuade its trading partners to pursue more 
expansionary monetary policies.  Neither of these remedies was being pursued.  Between 
1957 and 1971, the U.S. lost approximately 60 percent of its international reserve assets.  
Between June, 1970, and March, 1971, the U.S. lost approximately 8 percent of its gold 
reserves.  Burns worries that an even more expansionary monetary policy would worsen 
the balance of payments deficit and further accelerate the outflow of international 
reserves.   
Under the existing Bretton Woods system where the U.S. dollar served as the 
reserve currency, other countries were obligated to absorb dollar reserves from U.S. 
                                                 
9 Conversation 470 – 18, March 19, 1971.  Nixon and Burns.   10 
deficits, increasing inflation in these countries.  Many expressed dissatisfaction with the 
U.S.’s refusal to adjust.  In May, 1971, West Germany and the Netherlands floated and 
Switzerland and Austria revalued their currencies. This began a downward drift in the 
value of the dollar even before the floating of the dollar in August (Figure 3). 
  In his conversation with Nixon, Burns raises yet another justification for his 
resistance to easing monetary policy.  He warns that lowering interest rates now would 
cause rates to increase during the election year, with the implication that the resulting 
damage to housing will hurt Nixon’s reelection chances.  
Burns:  “If interest rates go down further through my actions…the probability as I see it 
is, they will go up later on in the year and in 1972.  Housing which is recovering very 
nicely will go into a tailspin in 1972.  Where will we be, as a country, and as a party and 
me personally?”   
Again, Burns emphasizes the adverse longer-run effects on inflation and interest 
rates if the Fed eases monetary policy further.  Interestingly, Burns doesn’t indicate any 
distinction between real and nominal rates and it certainly isn’t clear that rising rates 
caused by economic recovery or inflationary expectations would cause housing to go into 
a “tailspin.”  It is clear, however, that Burns does not want to conduct a more 
expansionary monetary policy and is coming up with as many reasons as possible to 
defend his position. 
June 8, 1971.   11 
  Milton Friedman visits the White House for the first of two recorded 
conversations.  He warns Nixon against using monetary stimulus to try to reduce nominal 
interest rates or unemployment.
10
Friedman: “I’m not optimistic because you cannot avoid a rise in interest rates in the next 
six months…I don’t know a thing about politics.  But it does seem to me that nothing 
could be more damaging to you in 1972.  …[than] if the price rise in 1972 is back up to 
7%.  I think in general unemployment is much more damaging politically than inflation. 
   
…but in the particular case of your administration and yourself it is even [tape skips] 
because we took extra measures to do something about it. And now it must pay off.” 
  Friedman’s advice about the political costs of reviving inflation has no impact on 
Nixon whose primary concern is reducing unemployment.  When Nixon took office the 
unemployment rate was 3.4%.  The contractionary monetary policy in 1969 produced a 
recession in 1970 and the unemployment rate increased to 6% and stubbornly remained 
there.  In July, 1971, one month after the Friedman visit, Nixon clearly reveals his 
interest in the unemployment rate and indifference to inflation by telling Peter Peterson, 
Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs:  “I’ve never seen anybody 
beaten on inflation in the United States.  I’ve seen many people beaten on 
unemployment.”
11
June 14, 1971. 
 
  Burns, Connally, McCracken and George Shultz meet with the President.  They 
debate the reason interest rates are moving up.  Shultz and Connally both think the rates 
                                                 
10 Conversation 514-8, June 8, 1971.  Nixon, Office of Management and Budget Director George Shultz 
and informal economic advisor Milton Friedman. 
11 Conversation 546-2, July 26, 1971.    12 
are rising due to economic growth and that the Fed should keep rates lower to facilitate 
the expansion.   
Shultz:  “I guess I’m more in John’s [Connally] camp than Paul’s [McCracken] on what’s 
happening in the economy … There is a good substantial expansion under way….To 
have a rise in interest rates in the face of the kind of monetary influx that Arthur’s been 
providing means there’s got to be a hell of a demand for credit. …That means there’s 
something real behind it somewhere.”
12
  Shultz reveals he thinks Burns has been providing a substantially expansionary 
monetary policy.  Burns, rather than focusing on the economic expansion, chooses to 
focus on his inflationary fears. 
 
Burns:  “The lenders, fearing an intensification of the inflation rate are holding out for 
somewhat higher interest rates, because they’ll be paid back in cheaper dollars.” 
13
  Burns’ view is that inflation is rising and suggests energetic action on the wage-
price front (wage and price controls were under consideration by the Administration) and 
a halt to an expansion in government spending.  It’s clear that Burns thinks the economy 
is overheating.  The “old” Arthur Burns, author of Prosperity without Inflation, would 
have applied a tighter monetary policy, but he surely knows that this would have been 
vehemently opposed by Connally, Shultz and, most importantly, Nixon.  Burns is shifting 
inflation fighting to tighter fiscal policy, constraints on increases in government 
spending, and to hoped-for wage and price controls. 
  
July 3, 1971. 
                                                 
12 Conversation 519 – 11, June 14, 1971.  Nixon, Burns, Connally, McCracken and Shultz. 
13 Shultz and Connally assert that the income effect exceeding the liquidity effect is increasing nominal 
interest rates while Burns feels rising nominal rates are due to increasing inflationary expectations.   13 
  Nixon and Shultz discuss a possible vacancy on the Federal Reserve Board.  
Nixon, wanting to increase the pressure on Burns, tells Shultz to inform Burns that he 
already has someone in mind for the position, although in fact he has not identified a 
candidate.  Again Nixon seeks to manipulate the independent Fed chairman. 
Nixon:  “I’ll tell you what I’ve done.  I’ve told Connally to find the easiest money man he 
can find in the country.  And one that will do exactly what Connally wants and one that 
will speak up to Burns… and Connally is searching the god damn hills of Texas, 
California, Ohio.  We’ll get a populist senator [sic] on that Board one way or another.   
…If you know of someone that’s that crazy let me know too…I want a man on that 
Board that I can control.  I really do.  Basically that Connally can control…But Arthur’s 
not going to name that man to the Board, George.”
14
  The seven members of the Board of Governors are each appointed by the 
president to serve fourteen-year, non-renewable terms.  A long term presumably allows a 
Governor the opportunity to put short-run political considerations aside when voting on 
monetary policy.  Nixon’s scheme to appoint a reduce-unemployment-at-all-cost 
Governor demonstrates how a presidential short-run goal can be injected into Fed 
policymaking. 
 
July 24, 1971. 
  To further pressure Burns, Nixon tells John Ehrlichman and Bob Haldeman to 
leak a story through Charles Colson about a recommendation to expand the Federal 
Reserve Board, “Could you get one story leaked through the Colson apparatus about 
Arthur?... Recommendations are being made from among the President’s economic 
advisors that ... recommended that the Federal Reserve Board .. the membership be 
                                                 
14 Conversation 540 – 9, July 3, 1971.  Nixon, Ehrlichman and Shultz   14 
expanded…”  Expanding the seven-member Board would weaken Burns’ powers, 
especially if the additional appointees were loyal to Nixon.   
Nixon also wants another rumor leaked, directly attacking the Fed’s 
independence.  
Nixon:  “In view of the fact that the President has responsibility for full employment, the 
President is considering legislation to … the Fed has got to be brought in the …” 
Haldeman: “in the executive branch.” 
Nixon: “The independence of the Fed…” 
Haldeman: “is seriously in question.” 
Nixon:  “Connally feels, John and Bob, that it’d be helpful…  he thinks it might sort of 
worry Arthur a little.” 
  While the Fed has considerable independence, its powers are derived from federal 
legislation.  Laws can be changed and Nixon now spreads rumors that he may do so in a 
way that would reduce the independence of the Fed.   
  Nixon and Haldeman continue discussing two pending vacancies on the Federal 
Reserve Board.  Nixon reiterates his desire to fill the positions with individuals who will 
support his desire for an easier monetary policy. 
Nixon:  “We’re going to fill ’em both with basically easy money men.” 
Haldeman:  “George (Shultz) said both he and Connally are under orders from you to 
find the easiest money man in town.”
15
July 27, 1971. 
 
  Nixon reiterates his desire for a more expansionary monetary policy. 
                                                 
15 Conversation 545 – 3, July 24, 1971.  Nixon, Ehrlichman and Haldeman.    15 
Nixon:  “I want him [the new member to the Fed’s Board] to be a guy that’s more 
interested in the job front than the inflation front.”
16
August 4, 1971.   
 
Connally reports to Nixon that Burns fears that Treasury is moving to take over 
the Fed. Connally reports that he told Burns it was not his goal.  Nixon’s leaked messages 
have gotten through.  Burns is now clearly aware of threats to Fed independence, despite 
Connally’s denial.
17
August 12, 1971.  
 
  Connally states that he expects another bad day at the gold window and that we 
are “constantly losing the initiative”.  The reference is to the gold drain.
18
Nixon is reluctant to suspend dollar convertibility and stalls: 
   
Nixon:  “…if we’re going to have to move our timetable up and uh try to explain all this 
thing you know, that’s a hell of a hard thing to explain to people.”
19
August 12, 1971   
 
  In spite of Connally’s urging to accelerate the program, Nixon expresses his 
desire to call Congressional leaders back on September 7 and announce the program then.  
Later, Connally predicts that closing the gold window will not be the main focus of 
public attention. 
Connally:  “To the average person in this country this wage and price freeze – to him 
means you mean business.  You’re gonna stop this inflation.  You’re gonna try to get 
                                                 
16 Conversation 547 – 9, July 27, 1971.  Nixon, Connally and Peterson.  
17 Conversation 554 – 7, August 4, 1971.  Nixon and Connally. 
18 Haldeman (1994, p. 340) records that “…the British had asked for $3 billion to be converted into gold.  If 
we gave it to them, other countries might follow suit.  If we didn’t, they might wonder if we had enough 
gold to support the dollar.  In either case, it was a major crisis.” 
19 Conversation 7 – 112, August 12, 1971. Nixon and Connally.   16 
control of this economy.   …If you take all of these actions…you’re not going to have 
anybody…left out to be critical of you.”
20
  A few minutes later Nixon agrees to accelerate the program. 
   
Nixon:  “I think we ought to go Monday [August 16, 1971] with the whole ball.”
21
August 15, 1971.
   
22
  Nixon gives a nationally televised address and announces his New Economic 
Policy (NEP).  NEP’s major provisions close the gold window, float the dollar, place a 
90-day freeze on wages and prices and impose a ten-percent tariff on imports.
 
23
September 24, 1971.   
   
Although Arthur Burns was a supporter of an incomes policy that would include some 
form of wage and price control, the tapes reveal he played little or no role in the 
development of NEP.   Connally, Pete Peterson and Paul McCracken were major 
supporters.  The tapes reveal that Burns was strongly opposed to closing the gold 
window.  Nixon who had long opposed price controls as unworkable was swayed by the 
political need to show something “symbolic” that he was fighting inflation and by the 
argument that the tariff on imports would adversely affect the inflation numbers.  
Importantly, the balance of payment and gold outflow problems were used by Burns to 
argue against Nixon’s urgings to pursue a more expansionary monetary policy.  NEP 
effectively eliminated this line of defense for Burns. 
                                                 
20 Regardless of his economic knowledge, Connally’s political skills are impressive. 
21 Conversation 273-20, August 12, 1971.  Nixon, Connally and Shultz. 
22 Nixon and his economic advisors moved to Camp David that weekend to discuss a program that had 
already been decided upon.  Taping equipment had not yet been installed at Camp David, so there is no 
indication of when it was decided to move the announcement forward from Monday to Sunday, August 15.  
23 While Connally is the leading advocate for the NEP, its true architect was Paul Volcker, except for the 
tariff.  “The import surcharge was Connally’s idea.  I kept taking it out and he kept putting it back in.”   
Telephone interview with Mr. Volcker by one of the authors, January 8, 2008.   17 
  Milton Friedman again visits the White House and warns of the inflationary 
consequences of the Fed’s current monetary policy.  Friedman’s warns that NEP’s wage 
and price controls would likely make the inflation problem worse.   
Friedman:  “Now on the domestic side, there are two questions or problems.  One is the 
technical problem of how you unwind the price control.  [garbled]  But I think there is a 
more fundamental or basic problem.  The great danger lies in the path we are now on, is 
that, under cover of suppressing the inflation, the true inflationary forces will be 
increased.  That’s the real danger.  Because the Congressman says, ‘Why do we have to 
worry about inflation?  Here’s the CLC [Cost of Living Council], they’re taking care of it 
for us.’  Now that’s a very real danger, because we want to look forward…” 
Nixon:  “They’ll spend more.” 
Friedman:  “They’ll spend more.  The same danger with the Fed.  When it sat down, it 
could print more.  Now from your point of view and our point of view, we want to look 
forward, not only to ’72, but beyond that.  We don’t want, we all want a victory in ’72, 
but we don’t want a victory which has to be followed by a course of action that puts the 
Democrats in power for 20 years.”  
Nixon:  “Yeah.” 
Friedman:  “[garbled]… If you let the inflationary pressure build up over us, we might be 
able to hold it down at least through the election [in 1972].   [Garbled]   After this, you’ll 
have a great upsurge in inflation.  And there would be again pressure to stepping on the 
brakes, hard again.  We will have thrown away the advantage, what we gained with the 
cost of the 1970 recession.  You’ll have to have an even worse recession.  And, if in 
1974, your fortune is to superintend a severe recession, that’s going to put the Democrats   18 
back in for 20 years.  Now that’s a horror story and I don’t mean to say it’s [garbled].  It’s 
possible.  Now the question is how to avoid it.  And the key to avoiding it is our friend 
Arthur [Burns], as I was telling you last night.”  
Nixon:  “Uh, huh.” 
Friedman:  “Because Congress will not be able to, I think, prevent from spending and 
we’ll have a whopping [garbled] deficit.  And if the Fed monetizes that deficit and 
increases the quantity of money at anything like the way it did in the first six months of 
this year, I’m afraid that the scenario I’ve described is inevitable.”
24




Nixon is worried that a tight monetary policy applied “too soon” would adversely 
affect the employment picture prior to the election.  In this conversation, Shultz and 
Nixon also express concern that the Fed had engaged in monetary “contraction” in the 
previous month.  Friedman asserts what later becomes conventional wisdom that month-
to-month money supply numbers are not very meaningful and assures them that a robust 
economic recovery is underway.  Friedman predicts that unemployment will not be a 
problem for the 1972 election and restates that the real problem is to keep the money 
supply growth in the 4-5 percent range so that inflationary pressures will not build up.  
Friedman’s advice falls on deaf ears. 
   
Burns Blinks, November-December, 1971.  
                                                 
24 Friedman proved correct in that the relaxation of controls and the 1973-74 energy crisis resulted in a 
surge in inflation.  Slower monetary growth reduced inflation but contributed to the 1973-1975 recession 
that was a factor leading to President Ford’s defeat.  What Friedman could not foresee is that inflation and 
unemployment problems and the Iranian hostage crisis would undermine the subsequent Democratic 
President, Jimmy Carter. 
25 Conversation 578 – 4, September 24, 1971.  Nixon, Shultz and Friedman.  The 90-day wage and price 
freeze has been in effect for over five weeks.     19 
  Burns abruptly reverses his position on monetary policy and announces to a 
delighted Nixon two reductions in the discount rate on November 10 and December 10.
26
December 22, 1971. 
    
Nixon, ever distrustful of Burns’ true intentions, queries George Shultz on his 
recent conversation with Burns. 
Nixon:  “Now what about the money supply?” 
Shultz:  “He [Burns] agrees that the money supply should now go up.” 
Nixon:  “Is he going to do it?” 
  Shortly after, Burns enters the room.  After exchanging pleasantries, Burns 
eventually says “I’ve got Federal Reserve problems” and discusses his disappointment in 
the new nominee to the Board and details his concern that John Connally’s views 
influenced the decision.  Nixon details the decision process, which involved various 
political considerations (never mentioning the-easiest-money-man criterion, however), 
and assures Burns that “your views will receive primary weight” and that Nixon would 
never appoint someone Burns vetoes.  Nixon says that as a rule he never considers 
candidates that an agency or department head vetoes.  After the men finish the discussion 
about the appointment process, the meeting seems to be wrapping up when, 
Nixon:  “[garbled]…I’m not going to raise this point, but these people have asked me 
about the money supply.  Burns can take care of it.  Correct? [garbled]” 
Burns:  “Burns is on the line.” 
Nixon:  “Arthur, [garbled].  You’re independent! [Burns laughs]. Independent!  You get 
it up.  I don’t want any more nasty letters from people about it.  OK?” 
Burns:  “That [no more nasty letters], I can’t guarantee.”   
                                                 
26 See Abrams (2006) for conversations announcing this change in policy.   20 
Later, 
Nixon:  “The whole point is, get it [the money supply] up.  You know, fair enough?  Kick 
it!”
27
  Three months prior to this conversation, Milton Friedman warned Nixon [Conv. 
No. 578-4 above] about wage and price controls and the temptation they would provide 
for engaging in expansionary fiscal and monetary policies under the illusion of price 
stability.  Burns is now “on the line” and playing ball.  Burns and Nixon are now doing 
precisely what Friedman warned against.  Burns’ and the Fed’s “independence” are now 
a source for jokes. 
 
  After Burns leaves the room, Nixon and Shultz discuss a letter from Milton 
Friedman that apparently took aim on the Fed’s already expansionary monetary policy.  
They are concerned that Friedman’s letter might influence Burns to retract his promise to 
further increase the growth rate for the money supply.  With wage and price controls set 
to operate through to the election, Nixon now focuses his attention on keeping Burns to 
his word about delivering on the money supply (see Abrams, 2006).
28
Concluding Remarks. 
  Burns made good 
on his promise and continued the Fed’s expansionary policies through 1972. 
  Richard Nixon craftily engineered credible threats to Burns’ power and to the 
Fed’s independence.  By giving Nixon the monetary policy he desired, Burns removed 
the presidential threats to the Fed’s independence.   At the same time, the costs of 
engaging in a more expansionary monetary policy were reduced by Nixon’s New 
Economic Policy (NEP) launched in August, 1971.  NEP abandoned the Bretton Woods 
                                                 
27 Conversation 640 – 3, December 22, 1971.  Nixon and Burns.  Burns, in fact, succeeded in getting the 
Open Market Committee to agree to a more expansionary monetary policy (Abrams, 2006). 
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fixed-exchange rate system.  This meant that monetary policy could become more 
expansionary without further draining America’s diminished gold supply, a previous area 
of concern for Arthur Burns.  NEP’s wage and price controls also meant that a more 
expansionary monetary policy wouldn’t worsen reported inflation, at least in the short 
run.   Arthur Burns may have believed an excessively expansionary monetary policy in 
the run-up to the election could be reversed after the election without seriously worsening 
inflation.  Data reveal that the Fed indeed did reverse monetary policy in the year after 
the election by raising the discount rate in steps from 4.5 percent to 7 percent.   But the 
reversal proved to be inadequate to extinguish inflationary pressures.  Arthur Burns 
proved to be a good forecaster.   In early 1971 he said, “If we flooded the banks even 
more than we have I think you could have awful problems in 1972 and beyond.”   The 
money supply surged in 1971 and 1972 and the stage was set for a decade of serious 
inflation. 
 The new evidence from the Nixon tapes presented in this paper provides support 
for the hypothesis that the excessively expansionary monetary policy conducted during 
the Burns-Nixon era was not the result of a simple policy miscalculation, but rather a 
politically motivated objective to reduce unemployment in the run-up to the 1972 
election.  The tapes reveal that Arthur Burns resisted accommodating Nixon’s policy 
recommendations for many months, but suddenly acquiesced in November, 1971, after 
receiving various threats to the Fed’s independence.  22 
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Data for M2, the unemployment rate, the CPI inflation rate and the federal funds rate are 
from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis – ALFRED database: 
http://alfred.stlouisfed.org/  ALFRED provides data series as of a specific date, or 
vintage. 
 
M2 growth is vintage January 1975, and is computed using the original definition of M2, 
including currency, and checking, savings and small time deposits in commercial banks. 
 
The inflation rate is computed using the vintage January 1975 CPI, 1967=100. 
 
The unemployment rate is vintage January 1975. 
 
The effective federal funds rate is never revised. 
 
 
The G-10 exchange rate index is from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System H.10 Statistical Release: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10?Summary/.  
This is the revised index as of 1978, which was discontinued at the end of 1998. 
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